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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the current stance of multiculturalism and diversity in 
Europe by taking a closer look at the perception of Muslims in the United 
Kingdom and France. It is a comparative study that analyzes the sentiments of 
nationalism along with how a series of pivotal events that have impacted the 
integration process of the Muslim populations. A look at certain key factors such 
as cultural and identity clashes, increasing instability in the Middle East and the 
influence of the media, demonstrates a rise in Islamophobia in Europe. By 
focusing on how the rise in Islamophobia has affected the perception of Muslim 
immigrants, the current level of acceptance is shown to be lacking. The UK shows 
how, even with a background in nationalism that is used to accepting diversity, a 
rise in anti-Muslim sentiment makes it step away from a politics of 
multiculturalism. Whereas, France’s emphasis on secularism and its connection to 
French culture and nationhood, slows down the acceptance of diversity, while 
rising Islamophobia makes it even harder for Muslim immigrants to find a place in 
French society.     
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction 
 
Europe has been waging an internal battle against a rising tide of nativist 
nationalism emerging as a challenge to multiculturalism. The rise in nativism is due to a 
multitude of factors, primarily owing to an increase in security threats and economic 
concerns, both of which are connected to a concern over the perceived increase in 
immigrant populations. Most specifically, Islamist terrorism is seen as the highest source 
of threat;
1
 which has contributed to a rise in negative attitudes towards the Muslim 
populations in Europe. This has raised many questions about the current position of 
multiculturalism and tolerance.  
The direction of global politics has taken a prominent shift; the advance of 
globalization is decreasing. Islamist terrorism has been linked to many cases such as, the 
7/7 attacks in London, the Charlie Hebdo incident and most recently, as a contributing 
factor to Brexit—all of which indicates a clear message; there has been a rise in anti-
Muslim sentiment, more profoundly referred to as Islamophobia, which seems to be 
rendering attempts at cohesion futile. As many scholars have already stated, if 
multiculturalism does exist in European countries today, it appears to be a failure.
2
 This 
paper will define multiculturalism as the co-existence of several different ethnic groups 
within one society, all able to perform their own diversity and live heterogeneously in 
                                                          
1
 Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, “Europe’s Experience in Countering Radicalization: Approaches and 
Challenges,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7, no. 2 (2012): 163. 
2
 Esther Romeyn, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Spectropolitics and Immigration,” Theory, Culture and 
Society 31, no. 6 (2014): 79. 
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one country.
3
 The concept and definition of Islamophobia will be thoroughly discussed 
within the methodology section.  
Due to the movement of people into Europe over the past several decades, 
because of economic or safety reasons, it has become an undeniable fact that many 
European countries are now much more diverse than they have historically been.
4
 
Although, (before the Syrian refugee crisis) Muslim immigration did not show a 
paramount increase in comparison to immigration from other religious groups, the 
perception that they represented much of the increase was persistent. 
5
 This perception 
stemmed from the visibility of minority groups, especially those that were frequently 
linked to violence and war in the media. Moreover, many Muslims, because of their skin 
colour or particular Islamic dress tended to be more visible, and easier to identify as 
‘outsiders’.6  
Even though the Muslim populations in Europe come from diverse backgrounds 
they are grouped together under a single identity based on their religion. There is no other 
group of immigrants in Europe that are categorized primarily for their religious 
affiliation.
7
 Placing all Muslims under one category has served to address them as a 
whole in public discourse and public policy concerns. It is an indicator of the presence of 
                                                          
3
 Shireen Mazari, “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe,” Policy Perspectives 7, no. 1 (2010): 91. 
4
 Mazari, “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe,” 91. 
5
 Phillip Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 11 (2014): 
2066. 
6
 Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2066. 
7
 Jose Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe Catholicism in the United States,” Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 34, no. 4-5 (2012): 489. 
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anti-Muslim sentiment in European societies. Furthermore, treating Muslims as one 
group is part of a grand development through which limits and subject positions are made 
and disputed under the guise of racial politics that creates difference out of both 
biological and ethnic indicators.
8
 The isolation of a minority group, like the Muslims, 
reflects the issues over the acceptance of diversity in Europe, which will be further 
analyzed within this paper. 
Literature Review 
There has been a vast amount of literature looking at the problems of 
multiculturalism and Islamophobia in Europe. Some of the literature is more general and 
aims to cover a specific idea within the broader context of Europe,
9
 while other literature 
provides a more focused case study of specific countries
10
. Some of the frameworks 
through which the literature engages with the topic are through defining diversity and 
citizenship,
11
 by looking at the ideological struggle between nationalism and 
integration,
12
 and as a policy centered analysis over securitization.
13
 
                                                          
8
 David Tyrer and Salman Sayyid, “Governing Ghosts: Race, Incorporeality and Difference in Post-Political 
Times,” Current Sociology 60, no. 3 (2012): 355. 
9
 For example look at, Erik Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” The International Spectator 48, 
no. 1 (2013): 102-116; Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and 
Policy,” The British Sociological Review 55, no. 2 (2004): 237-257; Alexander C. Jeffrey, “Struggling Over 
the Mode of Incorporation: Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 
4 (2013): 531-556. 
10
 For example look at, Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, “The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia; Anti-
Muslim Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2011,” Journal of Sociology 43, no 1 (2007): 
61-86; Jeremy Gunn, “Religion and Law in France: Secularism, Separation and State Intervention,” Drake 
Law Review 57 (2009): 949-984; Maxim Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism. ‘Diversity Statistics and the 
Race Issue in Contemporary France,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 17, no. 2 (2014): 118-133.  
11
 See, Steven Vertovec, “Super-diversity and its Implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 6 (2007): 
1024-1054; Didier Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism: A convergence in Progress?” 
Journal of Intercultural Studies 32, no. 3 (2011): 229-243; Matthias Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim 
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Diversity and Citizenship 
         Some works focus on immigration to describe diversity and the Muslim 
experience. Connor expands the study on the theoretical claim of immigrant diversity by 
quantifying it. He draws from Vertovec’s concept of “super-diversity” to explain how the 
origins of immigrant populations are becoming more and more diverse.
14
 His results 
suggest that although immigrant diversity is high in most European countries, their 
origins and religious backgrounds remain stable.
15
 He further suggests that some 
immigration trends may encounter a change in the future if older generations go back to 
their origins,
16
 although, this seems to be a dubious assessment. 
On the other hand, Vertovec provides a theoretical look at the diversification of 
diversity by specifically focusing on the case of the United Kingdom. With his paper 
published in the late 2000s, Vertovec coins the term “super-diversity” in order to draw 
the attention of policy makers and academics to the ethnic origins and other factors of 
diversity within immigrant communities that should be taken under account when 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Migrants in Western Nation-States- A Comparison of the United Kingdom, France and Germany,” Journal 
of International Migration and Integration 6, no. 2 (2005): 219-234. 
12
 See, Chris Allen, “‘Down with Multiculturalism, Book-burning and Fatwas’: The Discourse of the Death 
of Multiculturalism,” Culture and Religion 8, no. 2 (2007): 125-138; Nadia Kiwan, Identities, Discourses and 
Experiences: Young People of North African Origin in France (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2009); Ahmet Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe: Analyzing French Exceptionalism,” 
Comparative Politics (2008): 1-19. 
13
 See, Jocelyne Cesari, “Securitization of Islam in Europe,” Die Weltz Islams 52 (2012): 430-449; Leslie S. 
Lebl, “Radical Islam in Europe,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (2010): 46-60. 
14
 Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2056. 
15
 Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2066. 
16
 Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2059. 
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addressing these groups.
17
 His aim is to change the way in which diversity is perceived 
and studied. Thus, “super-diversity” is defined as a multi-faceted perspective on 
diversity.
18
 Vertovec further highlights that new immigrants have a tendency to settle in 
the areas where other immigrants of their origin are already established.
19
 This could be 
contributing to why certain immigrant groups have a harder time integrating into 
mainstream culture. 
Lack of assimilation is observed in other literature that attempts to explain why 
this is the case in Europe. Casanova, places the blame on secular European cultures that 
have constructed a limit to their level of toleration.
20
 He claims that immigrants falling 
into the Muslim category are from several different ethnic origins, yet referred to with 
one classification, when other immigrants are not placed under similar restraints.
21
  
Casanova also mentions that this is a relatively new phenomenon which did not exist a 
few decades ago. Although, he does not discuss how this could be an indication that 
Islamophobia has increased or what the corresponding factors may be. 
Other works provide a comparative analysis between the UK and France, focusing 
on their response to diversity. Earlier analyses on these countries point towards their 
differences in toleration towards diversity. Drawing the conclusion that minority religious 
groups, such as the Muslims, experienced a great deal of resistance from a highly 
                                                          
17
 Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1025. 
18
 Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1026. 
19
 Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1041. 
20
 Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism,” 490. 
21
 Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism,” 489. 
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centralized and secular French state, whereas, the UK has shown a more liberal model of 
toleration.
22
 On the other hand, this literature notes that a ‘multicultural’ model of 
citizenship has entered Western Europe, which could lead to more integration of religious 
groups.
23
 
More literature looks at the how diversity has been defined through policy. 
Lassalle’s article provides further comparison by discussing the policy framework behind 
the inclusion and incorporation of minority groups. He explains that in order to deal with 
race inequalities, British policy is developed on the framework of multiculturalism and 
acceptance of pluralism.
24
 On the other hand, French policy is drawn up with a focus on 
the concept of laïcité (secularism),
25
 which for this issue, looks specifically at citizenship 
and integration.
26
 Lasselle claims that although these countries started out with differing 
perspectives, in later years their outlooks have converged and their laws are now more 
similar on a lot of issues regarding access to citizenship and immigration.
27
 He displays a 
positive perspective towards a convergence and acceptance of diversity. Although, these 
works make a timely comparison of the countries’ stance on diversity from the mid-
2000s to the end of 2010, more recent occurrences in politics and policies (which will be 
expanded on within this paper) in these countries begs to question if the positive attitude 
towards a ‘unity in diversity’ is still present in the UK and France of today. 
                                                          
22
 Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants,” 227. 
23
 Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants,” 230. 
24
 Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 230. 
25
 This term will be defined further in the third chapter. 
26
 Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 230. 
27
 Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 240. 
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Some scholars have linked the conceptualization of modern French citizenship to 
the post-1980s immigration discussions.
28
 Ideas of French nationhood have been tied to 
‘homogeneity’ and ‘continuity’.29 Moreover, many scholars have depended on the ideas 
of Charles Taylor to expand on the idea of nationalism and secularism in France. These 
ideas are rooted in the French revolution of 1789, which is also where Gunn argues that 
laïcité has come from. He also compares the laws on secularism between France and the 
US, drawing parallels on a similar conception of secularism and separation between the 
state and the church. 
Nationalism and Integration 
         As immigration and diversity within previously homogenous European societies 
has increased there has been a backlash in the form of nationalist tendencies. The 
literature on this topic highlights the concerns of economic and cultural capital, as well as 
the perceivably increasing amount of terrorist activity arising from Islamic groups.
30
 
Thus, Islamophobia is considered as a leading variable in the surge of nationalism. In a 
similar light, Allen argues that nationalistic debates over tolerance, liberalism and 
secularism are imbued with disguised anti-Muslim sentiments.
31
 His analysis agrees with 
the vast amount of literature that claims there are limits in the European landscape when 
it comes to acceptance.   
                                                          
28
 Maxim Silverman, “Citizenship and the Nation-State in France,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 14, no. 3 
(1991): 333. 
29
 Silverman, “Citizenship and the Nation-State in France,” 336. 
30
 Yunis Alam and Charles Husband, “Islamophobia, Community Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism Policies 
in Britain,” Patterns of Prejudice 47, no. 3 (2013): 235-252. 
31
 Allen, “‘Down with Multiculturalism,” 127. 
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         Subsequently, many scholars point to a deeper problem in European 
multiculturalism; which is the struggle over identity. This draws back on even older 
debates concerning the European Union and its reluctance to accept Turkey. This is due 
to Turkey’s Muslim culture not being seen as European.32 Jones argues that politics of a 
nation-state naturally depend on the creation of an imagined community.
33
 Therefore 
implying that nationalism is part of the equation that keeps European states cohesive. 
However, he presents a constructive argument aiming to reconcile the problems 
associated with integration of minorities in Europe. Jones is positive that a re-
construction of the European identity to be inclusive of diversity is the solution to the 
problem, for which end he offers several suggestions. 
There has been a multitude of academic discussion on the multicultural nature of 
the UK, especially with a focus on the British Muslim experience. Some of the top 
scholars on this topic, such as Tariq Modood and Amir Saeed, have been examining the 
meaning of British nationalism and belonging in the UK since the early 1990s. Some of 
the literature argues that multiculturalism in a society comes as a celebration and addition 
to national identity as opposed to a threat. From this perspective, multiculturalism is a 
form of globalization and acceptance towards diversity. Modood notes that the idea of the 
British “gentleman” is not too dissimilar to the model of a good Muslim.34 He addresses 
the core of the identity problem as being exclusionary towards religions that are not Euro-
                                                          
32
 Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” 103. 
33
 Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” 104. 
34
 Tariq Modood, Not Easy Being British: Colour, Culture and Citizenship (London: Trentham Books 
Limited, 1992), 3. 
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centric and Christian-centric, which automatically excludes Islam.
35
 Modood further 
points out that the problem is multifaceted, as minority groups tend to cling onto group 
identities, and as a result, not place enough emphasis on commonalities that come with a 
common nationality.
36
  
Similarly, Saeed argues that Muslims are seen as ‘un-British,’ as is exacerbated 
because of the influence of the media and the general research in the UK that points to 
non-whites being separate from British identity.
37
 This is because of what Modood 
clarifies to be “cultural racism,” which in the European context is explained to be 
hostility directed to a “racialized” or “racially marked group” because their culture is 
seen as alien to the norm of the country.
38
 These have led to the modern crisis of identity, 
which Poole blames on the media.
39
 Moreover, she argues that the media has played a 
large role in destabilizing the multiculturalism in the UK.
40
 She’s not the only scholar 
who thinks that British multiculturalism might be experiencing a downfall, as Joppke also 
argues that multicultural policies have been retreating and being replaced by centrist 
policies.
41
 
                                                          
35
 Modood, Not Easy Being British, 4. 
36
 Modood, Not Easy Being British, 4-5. 
37
 Amir Saeed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
Media,” Sociology Compass 1 (2007): 444. 
38
 Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2005), 11. 
39
 Elizabeth Poole, “The Case of Geert Wilders: Multiculturalism, Islam and Identity in the UK,” Journal of 
Religion in Europe 5 (2012): 162. 
40
 Poole, “The Case of Geert Wilders,” 162. 
41
 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 243. 
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 Other works focus on the study of nationalism in France by painting a more 
comprehensive picture of the different political parties’ stances on the main topics of 
dispute within the public sphere.
42
 Kiwan shows that the moderate left has been 
influenced by the political discourse of the right, especially on topics relating to the 
integration of minority groups. However, Kiwan does not provide a focused analysis on 
the experiences of the Muslim population. This is covered by many other scholars, some 
of which place an emphasis on the institutional discrimination of the Muslim 
communities in France.
43
 Whilst also drawing a comparison between the French and 
British reactions to Muslims, arguing that Britain has been the most accommodating to 
their Muslim populations.
44
 Subsequently, other scholars have argued that ‘race issues’ 
were commonly avoided in France; with the word ‘diversity’ only entering the public 
discourse in the 2000s.
45
 
Securitization and Policy 
         To provide an explanation for Islamophobia and the counter-terrorist measures 
which have escalated in the European states, some scholars have addressed the concept of 
“securitization”46 Cesari adds to the literature on securitization by expanding the concept 
to mean more than just speech acts.
47
 She argues that securitization happens in subtle 
                                                          
42
 Kiwan, Identity, Discourse and Experience. 
43
 Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies and Muslim Experiences in Europe”. 
44
 Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies and Muslim Experiences in Europe,” 3. 
45
 Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism,” 118. 
46
 Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 430-449. 
47
 Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 433.  
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ways through policy making and institutions.
48
 This demonstrates the general anti-Islamic 
sentiment in Europe and regularly impedes on their religious freedoms and civil liberties, 
in an otherwise, liberal Western Europe. This framework illustrates that Islamophobia has 
created a link between Islam and violence; and clearly blames Europe for accepting this 
mindset. 
         Other literature further blames European governments for the lack of Muslim 
integration in Western societies.
49
 Lebl argues that it is because some European 
governments allow the cultivation of ‘radical Islam’.50 This is done through a lack of 
governing policy in certain neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants. This 
results in the perpetuation of their own Islamic values over “European values,” which 
impedes their ability to assimilate properly.
51
 This view draws a large stroke over the 
diversity in Muslim cultures and appears to equate radical Islam with ‘normal’ Islam. 
Background on the Theory Literature 
The theory that will be used to explain my analysis is based on identity politics. 
This theory draws heavily from its philosophical roots, and has diverged in more 
contemporary times towards different areas of study including: political science, history, 
sociology and humanities. Within these areas of study there are further classifications that 
fall under the theory of identity formation such as: gender, class, sexuality, and race. 
Most literature classifies that identity politics has arisen under the liberal democratic 
                                                          
48
 Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 433. 
49
 Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 46-60. 
50
 Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 47. 
51
 Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 47. 
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system and is affected by the underpinnings of liberal ideology. Visible social identity is 
used to divide and suppress groups of people.
52
 More recently, identity politics has 
become an essential part of political discourse and poses definitive implications on 
political inclusivity, definitions of self-identity and the potential for national unity and 
resistance.  
The formation of identity is affected by a multitude of intersectional variables 
including; gender, racial and ethnic background, religious and political beliefs, sexuality, 
class et cetera. Intersectionality looks at the multilayered and complex nature of people’s 
multiple identities and how they experience discrimination.
53
 However, the focus of my 
paper will be on racial and cultural discrimination (which, in the case of Islamophobia, is 
linked to religion as well). This is because, the emphasis of my paper is on discrimination 
based on religion, thus although the effects of self-identification from various other 
sources cannot be ignored, racial and cultural classification is the most relevant category 
when studying diversity and multiculturalism in a society. Moreover, the scope of my 
paper does not permit me to look at all the variables of identity. 
This look at the literature will provide a historical preview of the relevant works 
in racial and ethnic identity theories, divided by the focus of the research. A vast amount 
of the research that initiated the academic discussion on identity politics, particularly with 
regards to race, has originated in the United States. The US has provided a fertile ground 
for the study and analysis of race dynamics because it has a well-known history of racism 
                                                          
52
 Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2005), 6. 
53
 Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Colour,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1242-1243. 
 13 
 
in slavery and amongst large immigrant populations, such as the Latin Americans. 
Intersectionality of identity with regards to race usually comes with gender as well, for 
this reason my review will also cover some of the more important works in this field. 
Identity Theory and Philosophy  
This review will cover the works in the field of identity politics by starting with 
the general category of identity formations with a focus on race and ethnicity. The study 
of racial identity theory is generally linked to notions of nationalism and how they work 
together. The earlier works in this literature owe a lot to philosophy. Especially to 
philosophers such as Frantz Fanon and Michel Foucault who have, respectively, written 
about race and sexuality.
54
 
Fanon’s writing on the black struggle to define their identity within postcolonial 
France in the 1950s sets the precedent for understanding “dislocation” and “separation” 
of one’s own racial identity.55 Fanon blames French colonialism in Africa for the 
disconnection between the French identity and African- French identity.
56
 He further 
highlights the importance of language, and a culture cultivated around that language; 
which creates barriers for integration and diversity for those who struggle to speak the 
language.
57
 Fanon argues that acceptance of one culture—more specifically, the way of 
speaking one language—is, in essence, the rejection of the other culture.58 As he says 
                                                          
54
 See, Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York:Grove Press 1967) and Michel Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality; Volume I: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
55
 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 25. 
56
 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 18. 
57
 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 28. 
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about the colonized black man leaving his “mother country” and moving to more 
“civilized” France; “He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness,”59 
Similarly, Foucault’s writing places an emphasis on language and its effect on the 
formation of identity. However, Foucault focuses on sex and how it has historically been 
a repressed subject, which has resulted in the repression of the people and their identity. 
He links sexual repression to a Marxist view of class struggle. In this way, Foucault 
outlines how the empowerment of sexual expression and identity is linked to politics and 
power. His work, The History of Sexuality, is also seen as one of the originators in the 
thought that sexual identity, especially homosexuality, is a product of genealogy.
60
  
Racial Theory  
 The theory on the formation of race as a part of identity is explained through 
philosophical and sociological frameworks, with some scholars also explaining the 
particular situation and disadvantage of certain groups. Some scholars aim to portray a 
general understanding of race as a group identity.
61
 Blumer describes race as a collective 
group.
62
 His theory goes further into how prejudice occurs and accelerates within a 
collective group mentality. This theory links the formation of racial identity to notions of 
nationalism, similar to Fanon’s theory. One race is made to feel superior and distinctive 
                                                                                                                                                                             
58
 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 18 
59
 Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, 18. 
60
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 43. 
61
 Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position” The Pacific Sociological Review 1, no. 1 
(1958), 3-7. 
62
 Blumer, “Race Prejudice,” 4. 
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in comparison to the others and this leads to an isolated definition of self, which is based 
on differences.
63
 Thus contributing to understanding how nationalism can rise alongside 
discrimination and segregation.  
Nationalist notions are a vast part of what defines racial identity politics, most 
especially in the US. Identity politics in the US initially provides an analysis of African 
American racial and national identity. Prominent scholars, such as Omi and Winant, 
identify the white settlers and slave owners as systematically placing the concept of 
“race” in America.64 Thus, the concept of “race” forms based on oppression and violence, 
and evolves in a trajectory leading to segregation. Race ideology comes with a set of 
“racial beliefs” and “racial etiquette” often based on a number of stereotypes.65 This 
ideology advances the thought of race as a natural and almost “scientific” division of 
people.
66
 “Racial formations” are then used as political tools to suppress. This view on 
identity looks at the sociological creation of race and its political implications.  
The discussion of race and identity is further contextualized by Alcoff, who 
brings in the importance of class and sex, to the question of race. Alcoff argues that the 
mere visibility of certain physical qualities automatically classifies one’s identity in 
society and therefore their privilege or lack thereof. She further states that capitalism 
perpetuates a racial system of wealth and a materialistic society that can only see what is 
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“visible” as the truth.67 This perspective puts an emphasis on physical appearance, as an 
identifier of race and ethnicity. It also brings forth the notion of second-hand racism and 
the ability to “pass” as a different race or ethnicity. Alcoff’s discussion is rooted in the 
Hispanic experience of racism in the US.  
But visibility as a criterion of discrimination has another side; invisibility in the 
race, one feels as though, they belong. “Passing” is then another form of racial 
segregation.
68
 For instance, passing for white, which could come as a privilege in some 
cases, actually leads to a deeper form of isolation.
69
 This is because the person that passes 
as a race outside of their own is then excluded from both races. Piper explains her own 
experience in this regard; perceived as white from the black community and seen as white 
from the white community until they became aware 
of her roots.
70
 In cases similar to this one, the sense of belonging one is told they must 
feel towards a particular race (and group) is skewed and identity formation is fractured.  
“Whiteness” as a privilege is further elaborated in other works that emphasize its 
value in society.
71
 “White power” and “white supremacy” as a socially constructed 
concept that both, those passing as white, and those not passing as white partake in.
72
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Thus, categorizing race in culture besets structural consequences for different groups.
73
 
This argument brings to light the significance of not only “race” but also “space”. From 
Lipsitz analysis the US is especially prone to an investment in whiteness because of its 
racialized history.
74
 Thus, the “space,” which in this case is America, is central to her 
argument, though the core of her argument could also be applied to different locations. 
This argument is similar to Fanon’s discussion of colonized cultures and how they create 
a future of racial classification that excludes and discriminates.
75
  
However, “race” fails to have a biological explanation. As Noel Ignatiev says, 
“the only race is the human race.”76 Thus as a social concept whiteness can be redefined 
in any way to exclude or include anyone, regardless of actual skin colour, as was seen in 
the case of the early Irish immigrants to the US. Thus, through his analysis Ignatiev’s 
discussion links racial identification to class position in society, while emphasizing the 
connection between class and race in identity theory.  
Identity of Race and Sex 
 The discussion of identity theory would be incomplete without the brief mention 
of its intersectional connectedness to gender and class. Class features as a prominent 
background explanation in the literature on racial theory. Gender (or sex) on the other 
hand, is often interconnected to the struggle of internal identity. In the case of racial 
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minorities, sex is usually ignored, and leads to an identity that is even further 
disadvantaged in society.  
  An example of this struggle can be seen in the literature explaining the 
phenomenon that excludes black women from the discourse on racial identity, and from 
the discussion on feminism.
77
 The main scholars in this field have argued that there is 
multidimensionality to the experience of a black woman (as opposed to a black man), 
which has been ignored by both society and academia for some time.
78
 The focus in the 
literature draws attention to the most privileged of the races, classes or sexes, and thus 
further disadvantages those who are “multi-burdened”.79 This concept is further discussed 
by Julie Bettie,
80
 who argues that schools routinely exclude certain cultures and 
languages which discriminate against girls of colour. 
William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 
         The theory I will be working with in my paper will mainly come from William 
Connolly’s, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.81 
Connolly’s book is an important addition to the theory on identity politics and is well 
cited by many scholars. In this book Connolly provides a qualitative study with an 
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interpretive framework in order to present a comprehensive theory on the formation of 
identity. He addresses that this is not a creation of a completely new theory; instead it is 
to provide an understanding of what Connolly observes to be a paradox in identity 
politics.
82
 He uses an interpretative approach to analyze how philosophy can be used to 
explain this paradox. In essence, it is still a theory generating methodology because 
Connolly attempts to answer why identity is formed from differences and contemplates 
the resulting political ramifications. 
Although the book is heavily saturated in liberal political thought and argues that 
modern identity politics is driven from liberalism, it also raises theological and ethical 
concerns with the problem of identity and difference. More specifically, Connolly wants 
to address how entrenched identities use ‘difference’ in order to supersede their ethical 
concerns. He then reflects on how identity is formed from this contradiction and the 
political implications of it. 
Connolly divides his arguments into seven chapters. He starts by posing the 
theological question of evil; ‘the problem of evil’ as he describes it, is the inescapable 
injustices of life.
83
 Connolly positions this problem within the concepts of freedom and 
responsibility and proceeds to expand its implications with regards to the individual, 
personally and collectively. His argument then moves towards the political realm, more 
specifically, to take a deeper look at international politics. 
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He explores how the concept of “otherness” entered the political discourse by 
referring to Tzvetan Todorov’s, The Conquest of America. The ethical dilemma centered 
in Todorov’s philosophy allows Connolly to create a bridge between the theological 
dilemma raised in the first chapter and the political implications discussed in the second 
chapter and onwards. By providing an analysis of Todorov’s conclusions Connolly is 
able to delve deeper into the theory of identity and pose questions on how the conception 
of identity has formed and functioned in political literature. He expands on how identity 
of Western (Christian) society in general was formed through invasions and 
conversions.
84
 Highlighting that identity is linked to tolerance and the community, which 
under further analysis means, it comes with its own self-interests.
85
 Thus, within 
international political strife, every country (community) is bound to fall back on its own 
self-interests, which makes international conflict resolution difficult.
86
 Therefore, 
‘identity’ is central to the study of international relations. Connolly then examines how 
the formation of collective identity superimposes a normalization of differences and 
concedes to neutralization of them in national discourse. 
The discussion on how global political discourse developed leads to Connolly’s 
main argument, which this paper will use as a basis and expand further on. Connolly 
provides a phenomenology on how personal identity is established and how it functions 
within the collective. In essence, Connolly argues that identity is constructed through a 
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collection of socially normalized differences.
87
 Thus, identity requires difference in order 
to exist and thrive.
88
 However, in liberal societies a dual contradiction exists. This is the 
difference between liberal individualism and liberal individuality. Connolly argues that 
liberalism in society aims to establish a ‘normal’ individual; this individual is created 
using a series of conventions and norms.
89
 In contrast to this, individuality espouses to 
create an identity in protest against the ‘normal’ identity.90 Thus, there is a ‘hegemony of 
identity’ which is normalized, and naturally, excludes diversity and anything that which 
is outside of its norm.
91
 Connolly further argues that humans are unable to escape the 
need to be a part of a collective, which will always come with its set of common rules 
and customs.
92
   
In later chapters, Connolly returns to the ethical concerns with which he started 
his arguments and addresses how ethical concerns are central to identity politics. He 
argues that in the creation of standards for the “true” shared identity within a political 
bloc, one must include responsibility. That is to say, the problem of normalized identities 
comes from their lack of responsibility and apathy towards the evils that result from the 
acceptance of one identity. Therefore, the solution is to insert a sense of responsibility 
towards what may not be accepted or whatever evil may come from having one standard 
identity in a society. 
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Connolly then further reviews how identity functions in a democracy and how 
territorial claims have alienating effects. This is because democracy works best within a 
state that has clear territorial boundaries and every state endorses a collective identity. 
Subsequently, a collective identity is inherently exclusionary.
93
 Thus, the state is 
responsible for the creation of its own marginalized, perhaps criminalized, groups. 
Connolly concludes by providing possible political solutions to the problems of identity 
he addresses throughout his book. 
 Identity/Difference provides a theoretical analysis that can be used to demonstrate 
how identity politics can explain the problems arising from diversity within a state. This 
paper will use Connolly’s theories as a stable to analyze the particular situation within 
each of the case studies.   
Methodology 
 This paper will answer the research questions;  
a) How have European countries responded to the rise of diversity, arising from an 
increase of the Muslim populations within their borders? 
b) Why is the rise of Islamophobia concurrent to the rise of diversity? 
In order to provide an answer to these questions a comparative historical analysis 
will be conducted with a focus on two case studies; the United Kingdom and France. The 
time frame for this analysis will be from World War Two to the present. There will be a 
specific focus on this time period because immigration experienced a large spike after 
WWII due to a higher need for workers in these countries, as well as elsewhere in 
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Europe.
94
 Therefore, the more homogenous European populations started to truly become 
‘diverse’ after this period, making it ideal to study the evolution of diversity from WWII 
onwards. 
The research questions will be analyzed in the following ways; 
a) How Europe has responded will be studied by looking at pivotal historical 
events and how they inspired a changed in the perception of the Muslims 
within these states. 
b) Why Islamophobia has arisen along with diversity will be analyzed by 
looking at the three reasons;  
1. Cultural and identity clashes between European cultures and Muslim 
culture 
2. Increasing rise of instability in the Middle East and wars 
3. The role of the media in elevating these two issues 
 My hypothesis for this research question is that a clash of cultures and identities 
between the Muslim population and, historically Christian, and secular Europeans has led 
to a rise in identity politics; hence a lack of acceptance towards diversity. 
The following key terms are central to the analysis which will be conducted in 
this paper and they will be further defined. ‘Diversity’, or ‘super-diversity’ (a term coined 
by Vertovec),
95
 is understood to encompass many different forms of diversity including, 
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religion, gender, age, origin, language, skill set and immigration status.
96
 However, this 
paper will look at immigrant origins with a particular focus on religious diversity as the 
most significant diversifying point. The manifestation of the diversity defined here, with 
regards to each case study, will be further assessed in the later chapters.  
 It is important to distinctly define the forms of racism and discrimination that this 
paper will examine. It is argued that the conceptualization of race and racism, along with 
racial inequality has historically been defined in limited terms.
97
 It is too dependent on 
the black-white relationship which is based on the, “Atlantic slavery triangle of Western 
Europe-West Africa- America.”98 Although, this dualist view of racism has progressed, it 
is still the classical view and remains resilient within the literature. Modood refers to this 
dualist perspective on racism as ‘colour racism’ and explains how it does not work for 
Asian immigrants in Europe.
99
  
Drawing on Modood’s perspective, I will expand the definition to include Muslim 
immigrants in Europe, and how this dualist view is inadequate for them as well. Modood 
describes, ‘cultural racism’, defined as a “racialized image” that “appeals to cultural 
motifs such as language, religion, family structure, exotic dress, cuisine and art forms.”100 
Thus, under this framework ethnic groups are treated as ‘alien’ and undesirable, with 
these motifs used to discriminate and harass them as a group and to justify treating them 
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negatively.
101
 Furthermore, it is important to note that the Muslim populations within 
Europe are a diverse group of people from different countries and cultures. As a diverse 
group, Muslims experience both, a ‘colour racism’ and ‘cultural racism’. Thus, their 
experiences are nuanced and Islamophobia is one umbrella under which discrimination 
against them can be studied. It should be noted that Islamophobia is a slightly 
controversial term, defined differently by various scholars. As a loaded term it is argued 
that it can be used in problematic ways.
102
 However, this does not justify the denial of the 
existence of the term.
103
 Given the rise of anti-immigration sentiments and policies 
directly targeting Muslims, along with the historical discrimination and disadvantages 
experienced by Muslims in the West, it is undeniable that there is racism directed at all 
those who are (perceived to be) Muslim. Thus, Islamophobia is an efficient and profound 
way in which to explain the condition and perception of Islam and Muslims in the West. 
Although the term has existed since before the terrorist attacks on the twin towers 
in 2001, it has gained more visibility and legitimacy in the post- 9/11 world.
104
 Many 
scholars have defined it broadly as racism against Muslims,
105
 with a view of Islam as 
violent and hostile. This paper will agree with this definition and further define 
Islamophobia as Islam being perceived as a uniform bloc that is separate from other 
cultures, inferior to the West, a violent political ideology, engaged and justified in its 
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discrimination and exclusion of Muslims from society, and its normalization of these 
hostile thoughts and behaviours.
106
 
The comparative analysis I will undergo will be based on two case studies, the 
United Kingdom and France. My reasons for choosing these two countries to compare is 
due to their geographic proximity, which presents a unique situation where they are both 
influenced by events that happen in the other country yet they have developed through 
separate histories and have thus created different frameworks for handling diversity. 
More specifically, they hold some of the largest Muslim populations in Europe.
107
 
Furthermore, these are two of the most powerful countries in Europe and a desired 
location for many present and future immigrants and refugees, meaning their diversity 
(especially with regards to Muslims) could increase significantly.  
 With a rise in extreme Islamic terrorism and ongoing conflict in Syria, this study 
hopes to situate the position of diversity in the UK and France. It is a timely project that 
aims to shed light on the perception of Muslims and their level of belonging in these 
countries, with the hopes of furthering and enhancing the discourse on diversity in 
Europe. Although, there are limits to this study, as it is based solely on secondary 
literature I am limited to what is already available. The abundance on literature on these 
topics means there is a struggle over deconstructing different frameworks in order to 
reconstruct them within my paper in a coherent manner. Moreover, there must be caution 
exercised over the biases which are present within every scholars work. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
Multiculturalism and Identity in the United Kingdom  
  “Take back control,” was the infamous slogan of the Leave campaign, and 
following its advice Britain took an exit from the EU. Brexit could represent the symbolic 
start to the end of globalization discussions. The era of supranational identities and 
celebrating diversity seems to be ending, while right wing nationalism is on the rise—in 
Europe and other countries all over the world. The case of the United Kingdom 
demonstrates how, after years of growth in immigration and diversity, instead of moving 
towards a better model of acceptance and inclusivity, there has been a push in the 
opposite direction. 
Brexit became successful regardless of Scotland voting to ‘remain.’ This along 
with the larger “population” concerns show how Britain is moving towards disunity. One 
of the main issues in the campaign to leave the European Union was on the role of 
demography.
108
 Along with the movement of peoples to and from the UK, were also 
socio-economic interests. These concerns were driven by the ‘free movement of workers’ 
within the EU, and the perception that jobs and money were being lost to non-UK born 
workers.
109
 Although economic issues played a role, it has been argued that the core of 
the problem went much deeper. “Take back control” was aimed at the topic where the 
public felt the most unease—immigration. Concerns about borders and incoming 
refugees and immigrants bred an atmosphere of fear, fueled by the crisis in the Middle 
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East and the potential ‘threat’ of Turkey joining the EU.110 Issues such as the strife in 
Syria were presented as a security and demographic menace in the Leave campaign.
111
 
The concern that Turkey would suddenly enter the EU exacerbated the dangers from the 
Middle East, as well as creating further questions on the identity of Europe. From the 
perspective of the Leave campaigners, the ideal future of Europe was at risk.
112
 As 
Kauffman argues, at its core, Brexit was motivated by identity politics.
113
 
At a Security Conference in Munich in February of 2011, Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, delivered a speech that addressed the failure of diversity in Britain; “Under the 
doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate 
lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a 
society to which they feel they want to belong.”114 These few lines highlight the lack of 
acceptance of multicultural communities in the UK. Moreover, the fact that this was a 
speech given at a conference on security issues, demonstrates that there is a perceived 
threat arising from multiculturalism, and in particular from Muslims.  
The history of the rise of diversity in Britain is fraught with a similar malaise. 
This chapter will analyze the current status of multiculturalism in the UK by focusing on 
the acceptance of its Muslim population. This will be done by identifying and analyzing 
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certain key moments in history that have had large impacts on the perception of Muslims 
in British culture and life. Firstly, in order to analyze how a nation, such as the UK, can 
be multicultural while maintaining its diversity under a single national identity, it is 
essential to understand the historical roots of the concept of Britishness and how its past 
affects its current form. Followed by the breakdown of the pivotal events that have 
occurred throughout the decades following the rise of immigration. These specific events 
were chosen because they show a clear transformation in the opinion of the society and 
provide markers for understanding how Islamophobia has revealed itself in the UK today. 
The manifestation of Islamophobia in the UK will be viewed under the British political 
context, which places an importance on immigration and border control, the local issues 
over limited resources which appear on the local and national news, and are then abused 
by nationalist politics.
115
 “Ethnicization of Islam is actually part of a wider process 
through which boundaries and subject positions are ascribed and contested within the 
context of a racial politics that circumscribes appeals to both biological and cultural 
(ethnic) registers for expressing difference.”116   
The events that created a change in the British opinion will be identified as the 
following; firstly, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973. This event illustrates how the British 
awareness of Muslim immigrants shifted from seeing them merely as different peoples to 
disliked peoples. Secondly, the Rushdie affair of 1989 further transforms the image of 
Muslims into hostile people that are threatening to society. The influence and importance 
of the media in the rise of Islamophobia can also be observed in this early case. 
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Subsequently, the Gulf-War of 1990, coming in the wake of the Rushdie affair, expedites 
the antagonizing and alienation of the Muslim settlers. Lastly, the 7/7 London bombings 
and the continual escalation of Islamic violence demonstrates the failing nature in the 
acceptance of Britain’s Muslim population. Thus, this chapter will argue that, although, 
the UK has attempted to embrace its diversity, their ventures have been progressive, but 
nevertheless, unreliable and deficient. 
History of “Britishness” 
 The concept of “Britishness” has many different and contradictory aspects. It is 
rooted in the idea of a nation-state, which naturally creates an “imagined community” of 
people.
117
 Moreover, nation-states have many different elements such as, geography, 
politics, history, culture and economy that come together through a process to create a 
single nation.
118
 A history of conquest and shifting borders also complicates the 
relationship of nationality. This is especially true for the case of Britain. British identity 
and citizenship has historically come with confusion about its boundaries.
119
 Thus, 
understanding the idea of “Britishness” is central to the concepts of citizenship and 
belonging.  
The concept of a ‘nation-state’ has inherent contradictions; a state holds power 
within geographic boundaries and provides its citizens with certain universal rights, 
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whereas, a nation, is the coming together of peoples who have some shared history and 
culture.
120
 Therefore, citizenship is meant to hold universal rights above cultural 
differences; however, it only exists within the boundaries of a nation-state which is based 
on cultural specificity.
121
 When a nation-state is being constructed there is spatial 
extension, which involves taking in different ethnic and linguistic groups.
122
 These new 
groups are later subjected to the national story of the dominant group. Similarly, the 
United Kingdom was constructed through the conquest of England over the other nations 
which are now part of its territory.
123
 Thus, British national identity, which is arguably a 
relatively new construct, was superimposed on the previously separate identities of the 
English, Welsh, Irish and Scottish.
124
 Yet, the dominance of the English over the rest of 
the ethnic groups is apparent in the name of the national language, supremacy of London, 
name of the country and the conditions some groups are held to before they can receive 
national belonging. 
More specifically, the national language is called English, not British.
125
 There 
have been many attempts to curb other national languages such as Welsh, Gaelic and 
Irish. 
126
 The power of England can also be seen in the economic and political dominion 
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of London.
127
 Moreover, Sales argues that, there is a prevalence in the interchangeable 
use of ‘Britain’ and ‘England,’ and some general confusion over the actual name of the 
country.
128
 Along with the common practice of a Scottish or Welsh person being referred 
to as British when they are successful, yet remaining Scottish or Welsh if they are not.
129
 
As Connolly argues, trying to establish an identity over an already established identity 
does not work.
130
 This is because the first identity already holds a certain social space 
within the national frame. The troubles of trying to establish a new identity on top of an 
existing identity can be further seen in the later attempts to integrate ethnic minorities 
into British society.  
With regards to the Irish, they have historically held an unclear position within the 
British nation. Having been partitioned in 1920, Ireland is Britain’s oldest colony. The 
divide between Northern and Southern Ireland, especially with regards to being part of 
the union, was never fairly resolved. This divide was in part due to the religious 
differences; the south was Protestant and preferred to be a part of the predominantly 
Protestant United Kingdom. This led to the construction of the borders of Northern 
Ireland with strategic and manipulative tactics.
131
 The troubling history of acquisition has 
bled into the ambiguous nature of the Irish in Britain. Although Irish citizens face much 
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economic and social discrimination, they are given full citizenship within Britain, which 
has strategic reasons.
132
  
Not only was the British state constructed through England’s domination over the 
other nations, it was also created whilst England was colonizing in Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent, America and elsewhere. Thus, British identity was constructed through 
conquest and supremacy; an empire in which the sun never set.
133
 The subsequent process 
of decolonization has led to the ambiguities within national identity and citizenship.
134
  
Decolonization and the formation of the Commonwealth afforded the previous 
colonials entry rights into Britain. This was a symbolic, universal equality bestowed 
because Britain felt responsible as the ‘parent’ of the colonized nations.135 However, 
when Commonwealth citizens tried to use their rights inside of Britain, they faced 
discrimination and animosity.
136
 The following decades have seen the struggles of ethnic 
minorities for full inclusion in the UK.
137
 As Sales argues, “tensions remain between the 
notion of Britain as a place and the concept of ‘British people,’ which is often seen in 
more exclusive ethnic terms.”138  
OPEC Oil Crisis 1973 
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 The issues over Britishness and belonging have only exacerbated as immigration, 
and thus diversity within the UK has grown. This section will analyze the social and 
economic   immigration patterns and economic concerns, which affected immigration and 
the perception of the incoming ethnic groups. Furthermore, the OPEC Oil Embargo of 
1973, and the resulting change in the perception of Muslim minorities will be examined, 
with a focus on how perceived identity clashes as well as, instability in the Middle East 
slowly begets Islamophobia in the UK. 
After the Second World War, the UK, as well as many other European countries, 
experienced labour shortages, which resulted in seeking external labour. Some of the 
incoming migrants were from other European countries, but majority came from former 
colonies, such as India, Pakistan and Jamaica, which had become part of the New 
Commonwealth.
139
 Legislation in 1948 allowed people who were formerly regarded as 
subjects of the British Empire, to become citizens of the Commonwealth, which gave 
them full rights to reside in Britain.
140
 It is noteworthy that the arrival of Empire 
Windrush in 1948 marked a clear cultural change. This boat brought 492 Jamaican 
migrants and symbolized the initiation of two immensely significant factors;
141
 the mass 
postwar immigration into the UK and the influx of visibly different populations.  
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By 1951, there was an estimated 218, 000 people of Commonwealth origin in the 
UK, this number increased to 541, 000 in ten years.
142
 Between the years of 1945-1961, 
as immigration from the New Commonwealth countries grew, although no legislation had 
yet to be established to stop this influx, there was an inauguration in the reconstruction of 
Britishness around race.
143
 Non-white people were seen as ‘alien races’, whose 
establishment within the UK threatening the ‘British way of life’.144 Similar to the other 
immigrants, Muslims were generalized under the labels, ‘blacks,’ ‘Asians’ and ‘Indians,’ 
without holding particular attention in the sea of ‘others’.145 Thus, during the early 1950s 
and 1960s, it is argued that Muslims were seen as “law-abiding, docile folks” with only 
their “colour and ethnicity” as the “problem”.146 
As economic stagnation of the 1960s worsened, Commonwealth Immigration Bill 
of 1962 was introduced.
147
 This bill significantly restricted the entry of workers from the 
New Commonwealth countries, even though, family reunification continued.
148
 The 
growth in diversity from populations that could visibly be marked as ‘ethnic others,’ 
along with the economic struggles of the 1960s led to the primary displays of xenophobic 
reactions in the UK. This can be seen in the “Rivers of Blood” speech delivered by Enoch 
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Powell in 1968, which urged for tighter controls over immigration.
149
 This led to the 
follow up Acts of 1968 and 1971, aimed to further restrict the entry of those not born 
within the borders of the UK or who had familial ties in the UK.
150
 Thus, the 1960s was a 
time of reaction against the initial rush and build-up of the mass postwar immigrants. At 
this time British policy aspired to assimilate the immigrants into British culture;
151
 in this 
way attempting to dissolve the differences within diverse cultures. 
Despite these restrictive Acts, the population of immigrants with Commonwealth 
origins rose to 1.1 million by 1971.
152
 During the midst of these struggles with the rise of 
diversity within Britain, was the OPEC oil crisis of 1973. This embargo was the result of 
political and economic strategizing of the Organization of Arab Petrol Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC), who demanded the evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab 
territory, as well as, the restoration of Palestinian rights.
153
 This embargo was, in part, 
caused by the October War between the Israelis and the Arabs in 1973. It translated as the 
entry of “oil power” into politics and reflected the dependence of industrialized states on 
foreign oil.
154
 Coming at the end of the postwar economic boom, oil embargo contributed 
                                                          
149
 Poynting and Mason, “The Resistible Rise,” 64. 
150
 Poynting and Mason, “The Resistible Rise,” 65. 
151
 Sardar and Ahmad, “Introduction,” 2. 
152
 McLaren, “Immigration and Political Trust in the UK,” 14. 
153
 Rudiger Graf, “Making use of the ‘Oil Weapon”: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab 
Petropolitics in 1973-1974,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (2012): 185. 
154
 Graf, “Making use of the ‘Oil Weapon,’” 185. 
 37 
 
to the economic crisis.
155
 This crisis led to the upsurge in the consumer prices of 
petroleum,
156
 which affected the daily lives of ordinary citizens in the UK.  
The oil crisis had an impact on the perception of the Muslims residing in Britain. 
Previously seen as merely different and ‘alien’, but otherwise not any different from the 
other immigrant groups, they were abruptly singled out from the rest of the ‘others’. 
Suddenly, “Muslims were regarded as despotic ogres, dangerous revolutionaries and 
violent, treacherous thugs bent on undermining decency and democracy.”157 This was, in 
part, due to the portrayal of Muslims throughout European history as depended on the 
“desires and fears” that the West cast onto them.158 After the oil crisis, all ‘Muslims’ 
were thought of as ‘Arabs’, and all ‘Arabs’ seen as deceitful and conniving people.159 
This perception was aided by decades of European history that characterized Muslims as 
infidels and bloodthirsty barbarians, due partially to, the challenge Muslims presented to 
the Crusaders and the invasion of Ottomans into Christian Europe.  
Thus, to the background of a rising tide of immigrants that were noticeably 
different, came the downfall of the economy and a series of events; including the Six-Day 
War in the Middle East and the OPEC oil embargo of the early 1970s. All of which show 
that negative changes on the perception of Muslims were starting to permeate into the 
attitude of the British. Furthermore, these events demonstrate how instability in the 
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Middle East was slowly starting to affect the lives of those living in the West. The 
significant change in the impression of the Muslim communities abroad was reflected on 
the Muslims within Britain. Transformation in the view of the Muslim populations could 
occur, more or less swiftly, because of a history of hostility and ‘othering’ already present 
between European and Muslim cultures. Although the oil embargo put the spotlight on 
the Muslim populations in the UK, and changed the perception of them from potentially 
neutral to disliked, it is noteworthy that they were not seen as ‘dangerous’ until the 
Rushdie affair of 1989. 
Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War 
The spread and rise of Islamophobia in the UK can be attributed largely to the 
media, which started to focus more on Muslims at the end of the 1970s. This section will 
examine the doctrine of multiculturalism, which began in the 1980s, and how it evolved, 
along with the impact of the Rushdie affair on demonstrating cultural barriers between 
Muslims and those in the West. Followed by the Gulf War and its significance on further 
alienating Muslims from “Britishness”. These vital events, which occurred within a few 
short years of each other, became global issues with the aid of the media and contributed 
to the rise of Islamophobia. 
The 1980s saw the beginnings of what would later be understood as globalization. 
There was a shift in the importance given to immigration as a political issue; the British 
government realized that immigration had led to a large diversity within the country and 
the new problem was incorporating minority groups into a multiracial and multicultural 
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society.
160
 The incorporation of multiculturalism in the UK in the 1980’s, reflected a 
society trying to address the needs of the growing minority populations whilst attempting 
to figure out how a multicultural model would work. It is noteworthy that the 1988 
Immigration Act, which removed the rights of New Commonwealth citizens to bring over 
their spouses,
161
 demonstrates a realization in the shift of political issues.  
In the case of the UK, multiculturalism was a strategy aimed at the immigrant 
populations, it was not for the nation as whole,
162
 which might have contributed to its 
demise in the later decades. Official multiculturalism in Britain was established in a 
laissez-faire way, where it was instituted in some branches of state and ignored in 
others.
163
 Moreover, Britain aimed to become a “community of communities”, where 
people were encouraged to practice their cultures in the delegated spot of the private 
sphere (in their private lives or their communities).
164
 The public sphere remained with a 
single political culture.
165
  
What intensified the problems of diversity was the ongoing economic malaise. 
There was large scale unemployment and few future prospects for a lot of the British 
youth, which in some cases was manifested in the white youth as an inclination towards 
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extreme right-wing groups and racists agendas.
166
 On the other hand, the minority groups 
which had been increasing since the late 1940s were no longer grateful immigrants 
seeking labour; there was a new generation of youth, born and raised in Britain.
167
 
Unemployment hit Muslims the hardest; they also had the least educational qualifications 
and highest numbers in manual work.
168
 Along with these troubles, they were amongst 
those most likely to be targeted for attacks on person and to property, as well as those 
living in the worst housing conditions.
169
 Thus, the new generation of Muslim youth 
faced a more profound social and identity dilemma. They were the fruits of both cultures; 
they retained the culture which they received at home from their parents and the 
dominant British culture in which they grew.  
The alienation felt by this generation of youth was even higher than the one for 
their parents; they experienced institutional racism from almost all parts of society such 
as, education, employment, housing and the media.
170
 This led them to believe that they 
could not belong in British culture, regardless of their efforts. The rejection from 
mainstream society resulted in some of these youths turning towards more orthodox and 
extreme forms of Islam for answers.
171
 This can also be seen as a form of resistance 
against the society in which they wished to belong, but were made to feel as if they did 
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not. Since identity is formed through differences,
172
 these youths fell back on what 
emphasized and exaggerated their difference when they reconstructed their identity 
against the collective. In essence, it was merely a struggle to find a place in society. 
The Rushdie affair came in the wake of the OPEC oil crisis and the Iranian 
Revolution, whilst the 1980s economic struggles, marking a grand transition in the 
perception of Muslims in the UK. Salman Rushdie’s ridiculing of the Prophet 
Mohammed in the novel The Satanic Verses produced a massively negative reaction from 
the Muslim communities. Muslim protesters took to the streets to burn copies of the 
book. Poynting and Mason argue that the protestors were hoping for public support,
173
 in 
what they felt was disrespect towards their beliefs and culture, however, the result was 
quite the opposite. Images of angry Muslims burning books were televised all over the 
world, and this was likened to images of Nazis or the Inquisition.
174
 These protests took a 
global turn when they were mirrored in other cities such as Johannesburg, Bombay and 
Islamabad, and gained an even bigger significance when the Iranian Leader called for a 
fatwa,
175
 to the global Muslim community, asking for the death of Rushdie.
176
 
The result of this affair was a demonstration in a clash of cultures. Western critics 
were astounded at what they felt was an attack on the freedom of speech, with some well-
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known people commenting on how Muslims appeared repulsive and backwards.
177
 
Within the UK, the perception of Muslims completely changed, they were now seen as 
potentially dangerous and uninterested in British values.
178
 At the same time, the Muslim 
communities in the West experienced a similar distaste; translating the reactions of the 
West to mean they were not interested in understanding why Muslims would be 
offended.
179
 Muslims became targeted as threats and ‘strangers within’. It had become a 
grand moment of collision and hostility, which contributed to the increase in 
Islamophobia.  
Subsequently, the Gulf War of 1991 occurred before the Rushdie incident had a 
chance to cool down. The Gulf War positioned the British state against the Muslims. This 
was because the British government became part of the effort against a Muslim country. 
Even though Britain’s role in the effort required cooperating with Arab Muslim countries 
in order to bring liberation to an Arab Muslim country, it resulted in a vast divide within 
the British population.
180
 Muslims within the UK were asked to prove their loyalty to 
Britain.
181
 It is interesting to note that anti-war sentiments expressed by white British folk 
were legitimized; however, a Muslim expressing anti-war sentiment was viewed as anti-
British.
182
 This atmosphere of fear and hostility escalated to attacks on Muslims residing 
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in Britain and imprisonment of some of them on the grounds that they were a ‘threat’ to 
national security.
183
 
The important role of the media in these debacles, and those that followed cannot 
be underemphasized. Following the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War, coverage of 
Muslims grew, along with an interest in Islam in the media.
184
 After these events new 
racist terminology entered the media and the negative portrayal of Muslims escalated.
185
 
For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were represented as, “separatist, 
insular and unwilling to integrate with the rest of society,” in the British media.186 This 
further contributed to creating a singular image of Islam and Muslims as the ‘other’ and a 
threat to Western societies, which further demonstrates the escalation of Islamophobia.  
It is well known that the media has the power to represent the world in any 
specific way.
187
 The media is ruled by those who are the primary definers of what is 
classified as news and the ‘correct’ version of it.188 It does not acknowledge that there is 
usually more than a single perspective on the meaning of an event.
189
 Furthermore, within 
the case of the UK, the media and its portrayal of immigration issues as race issues was 
seen in several studies; thus racism was the problem with race relations in the UK and its 
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media.
190
 Historically, ‘race’ in the British media has been portrayed as an ‘external 
threat’ in relation to fears of immigration,191 which has continued on to today and has 
contributed to Brexit. 
7/7 London Bombings 
 The 1990s in Britain was a time when race relations became even more important. 
There was an intensification of inequalities experienced by the minority groups, such as 
the Muslims and a growth in hatred, which led to violent reactions in later years. This 
section of the paper will analyze the 7/7 London bombings; the significance of how they 
brought the fear of security ‘home’ and demonstrated how Britain had failed to grow a 
sense of Britishness in its Muslim youth. Subsequently, the apparent failure of the 
multicultural model in the UK will be discussed. 
 It is without a doubt that the post-9/11 climate around the world has been a 
“pervasive culture of risk and insecurity,” which has shaped into, “Islamophobic and 
discriminating attitudes which cast a shadow on Muslims and further their resentment, 
thus playing into the hands of the radical political propaganda.”192 The events of 9/11 
have created an atmosphere of fear linked to terrorism, which in turn, is linked directly to 
Islam. This has led to a plethora of institutionalized Islamophobia, both in the UK and 
elsewhere.
193
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 The London train bombings of July 2005, later referred to as 7/7, were a series of 
attacks on the London transport system by British-born Muslim men.
194
 Coming at the 
wake of 9/11, the events of 7/7 very much brought the issues over security ‘home’. The 
results of these events were two-fold; not only did they exacerbate the Islamophobic 
attitudes, they also suggested a clear rejection of Britishness from some of the Muslims 
‘within’. Coming on top of an already established history of rising Islamophobia within 
the UK and a lack of acceptance towards Muslims; 7/7 in the post-9/11 climate, 
demonstrates the failure in British multiculturalism and integration efforts. Moreover, 7/7 
is especially significant because it increased the suspicions of threat coming from the 
Muslims living in the UK and suggested an inherent lack of assimilation between Muslim 
and British values. Thus, further alienating and ‘othering’ Muslim communities.  
 Furthermore, issues over immigration continued to be a major concern throughout 
the 1990s, with civil wars all over the world and asylum seekers trying to gain entry into 
the UK. Refugees were coming from places such as, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and 
Somaliland, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kurds from Turkey and Zimbabwe.
195
 
Paralleling the concerns over immigration was a growth in racism. Violence within the 
UK towards ethnic minorities had only grown over the 1990s. This can be demonstrated 
in the 1997 Human Rights Watch report, which indicated that the UK had one of the 
highest levels of racially motivated violence and harassment, having risen 275% between 
the years 1989 and 1996.
196
 Moreover, the report indicated that the problem was 
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projected to worsen in the following years.
197
 However, for a long period of time Britain 
suffered from codifying and thus, potentially denying the existence of racism within the 
country. This occurred through a process of referring to racism as ‘race relations’. Acts 
and institutions were created to improve, what was called ‘race relations,’ although 
perhaps the problem would have been better represented had they been called ‘anti-
racism’. 
 Failures in properly addressing racism resulted in the eventual downfall of the 
multicultural framework within Britain. Other concerns such as the rise in Islamophobia, 
security threats, and the ever present contentions over identity aided this demise. The 
race-riots of 2001 in various English cities, along with the events of 7/7, highlight the 
ongoing problem with race that multicultural policies had not been able to rectify. What 
came out of the reports following these riots demonstrate that in order to allow minorities 
to observe their own cultures, Britain had gathered ethnic groups into private 
communities and separated them from mainstream Britishness. Thus, there was no 
connection between the identity one held within their own ethnic group, and one they 
held within the nation; national identity remained singular. Moreover, public debates 
continually failed to properly address issues in race, religion and culture.
198
 As Connolly 
states, “If you are marginalized, stigmatized, vilified, or excluded by public 
identifications inscribed upon you, and if these identifications are somehow fundamental 
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to the integrity of collective identity, the politics of identity puts you in double 
jeopardy.”199  
Thus, the collective identity is the hegemony of a singular idea and set of traits 
that inherently have certain exclusionary characteristics. If one belongs to the groups that 
are excluded from definitions of collective identity then one’s freedom is impinged upon 
and they are secluded from the collective. Since the state is the official center prescribing 
collective action, it is also responsible for constructing the collective identity with the aid 
of its institutions. Therefore, the state defines, “the most fundamental division between 
inside and outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, the sphere of citizen entitlements 
and that of strategic responses.”200 In the case of Britain, Muslim groups had continually 
been excluded from the collective identity of the nation as a whole, which even 
multiculturalism could not properly remedy. This was because the collective identity of 
Britishness did not experience a large transformation. The framework of multiculturalism 
was aimed at the immigrant groups. Thus, it was recognized that they had their own 
culture, which the liberal state admitted they should be able to practice. However, this did 
not translate into giving them a place within the national identity; instead, it allowed them 
to form their own separate collective identities away from the national collective. 
Although, it should be noted that some scholars have argued that Britain’s imperial past 
and island mentality has made them more tolerant to diversity than other European 
nations,
201
 which can be seen in their attempts to adopt multicultural policies, initial 
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endeavours in giving citizenship rights to Commonwealth citizens, and accepting the 
presence of robust public debate surrounding multiculturalism within Britain. 
Nevertheless, more tolerance does not equate to more acceptance.  
Conclusion 
The ongoing fears of immigrants and the heightened levels of Islamophobia 
(because of a classification of Muslims as the ‘other’, growing conflicts in the Middle 
East, violence perpetrated by extremist Muslim groups all over Europe, and within the 
UK, and intensified media exposure of these issues) have led to a failure in 
multiculturalism and failure in the acceptance of diversity within Britain. This was 
demonstrated through the original construction of British nationalism, which was built on 
conquests and the exceptionalism of the English identity. These identity struggles were 
seen over and over again in the British case. Although, it should be noted that because the 
British nation was created with the coming together of several other nations (Welsh, 
Scottish and Irish) and they have retained a separate identity for themselves, there is a 
regional identity distinction that can be made. The English identity remains more 
exclusive than, for example, the Welsh identity in terms of creating a space for ethnic 
minorities to belong. Scholars have argued that there is more acceptance towards ethnic 
groups in the regions outside of England.
202
 For instance, studies show that a Muslim 
living in Scotland readily identifies as Scottish, as opposed to British.
203
 However, the 
English identity continues to “lay claim” on everything that encompasses Britain;204 
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including, ‘Britishness’. Therefore, it can be said that, in a sense, Muslims remain 
ostracized from attaining true Britishness. 
 From the OPEC oil crisis to the Rushdie affair, issues over clashing cultures and 
violence have shown an escalation. This has resulted in the rejection of British identity 
and the British multicultural model from the Muslim youth who deeply felt a lack of 
belonging in the country in which they were born. The struggle was only worsened by 
Middle Eastern wars and the British involvement in them, such as the Gulf War of 1991. 
Moreover, post 9/11 and 7/7 atmosphere of homegrown terrorism has placed the blame of 
a lack of integration on the failure of multiculturalism.
205
 This line of argument intones 
that multiculturalism has failed to be inclusionary enough and for that, Britain is to 
blame. However, this might be too simplistic of a correlation to make.
206
 Although, 
immigration remains a hot topic within the UK and differences are still seen as a lack of 
integration. Thus, minorities, such as the Muslims, remain at the center of social 
problems. As Poole argues, “The liberal response to Islam reveals a level of intolerance 
not found in other minority groups.”207 
There has been much scholarly debate on the presence of religion in the public 
sphere in Western societies, and how it does not have a place to belong.
208
 It has been 
argued that the nature of Muslim acceptance in European countries, such as Britain, is 
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inherently problematic because their identity is based on their religion.
209
 However, being 
identified based on their religion is not a conscious and active choice made by the 
Muslim populations in these places; it is Western society that defines them as such and 
then confines them into a system that is reluctant to see them in a different light. This is 
part of a larger problem of Islamophobia, which contributes to the exclusionary attitudes 
of Europeans towards the Muslims living in Europe.  
The British case has repeatedly demonstrated that although there has been much 
debate over the place of diversity within British culture and identity, acceptance has been 
lacking. The steps that were made towards integration and plural understanding of British 
society have currently taken a step backwards. With Brexit, a move towards right-wing 
politics and potential disintegration of the UK into even smaller pieces, the positive 
outlook on multiculturalism is dismantling.     
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CHAPTER 3:  
France, Laïcité and Islam 
Following the attack on one of the most famous streets in Paris close to the end of 
the recent French elections in the spring of 2017, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the 
National Front party, made an unsettling, yet not uncommon, speech addressing the 
prominence of security concerns in France; “L’islam radical défie nos valeurs et notre 
force d’âme [Radical Islam defies our values and our strength of soul].”210 This comment 
emphasizes the place of Islam as the ‘other’ that does not belong within French identity, 
as well as, nodding to a Catholic tradition with the phrase ‘force d’âme’211. Therefore, Le 
Pen’s statement has a dual effect; it rejects Islam, and thus Muslims, from partaking in 
French identity found in both the post-revolutionary France and in the ancien regime. 
That is to say, both modern secularism and traditional French ties to Catholicism. Le Pen 
is alluding to a nationalism that joins the past, present and future of France as connected 
to one another and indivisible; thus refuting the position of diversity in possibly changing 
that.  
 Issues relating to security and identity of the Muslim population are ever more a 
growing concern within France. Not only does France host the highest number of 
Muslims within Europe, it has also been one of the least accommodating towards ethnic 
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minorities.
212
 Issues over national identity and the integration of diversity have not been 
present in French discourse for as long as it has been in the UK. Moreover, a framework 
of ‘multiculturalism’ has never existed in France. Instead dealing with diversity has 
occurred through the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘integration’, both of which come 
under laïcité.
213
 
 This chapter will analyze how the French have responded to a rise in diversity, 
especially with regards to their Muslim population, whilst a rise in Islamophobia has 
occurred. This will be done through the analysis of certain significant laws and events 
that have had a major impact on the Muslims residing in France. This chapter will not be 
as historically linear in the development of analysis as the previous chapter due to the fact 
that the French case exhibits certain recurring concepts, which are better analyzed in 
groups rather than in a linear fashion. Firstly, the construction of laïcité and French 
notions of nationalism will be conceptualized and how it has coloured the experience of 
the Muslims in France will be laid out. Followed by an analysis of the head scarf scandal 
of 1989 and how it has been exacerbated with the aid of the media. Lastly, the 2005 
suburban youth riots in France will be examined under the context of rising Islamophobia 
due to conflicts in the Middle East and within and the failure in integrative frameworks. 
Thus, this chapter will argue that France’s dependence on secularism has delayed the 
discourse on pluralism within the nation and contributed to limitations in the acceptance 
of diversity. 
Laïcité and Nationalism in France 
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  This section of the paper will firstly, trace the conceptions of nationalism and 
citizenship in France. Subsequently, the impact of this conception of nationhood on the 
construction of the concept of laïcité will be analyzed. This will be done with a focus on 
the 1905 Law on secularism. Followed by a brief overview of how these concepts have 
affected citizenship and immigration. Although, direct translation and definition of laïcité 
is difficult to make, some scholars have defined it as ‘secularism’ and ‘secularity’.214 It 
will be further defined throughout this section with a historical analysis of its origins.  
The modern French sense of nationhood can be traced back to the French 
Revolution of 1789. Coming out of the Enlightenment values, “the Revolution 
established the nation as a voluntary association or contract between free individuals.”215 
Thus the Republican concept of nationhood has come from putting an emphasis on the 
sovereignty of the people.
216
 This conceptualization of the nation as ‘une et indivisible’ 
(one and indivisible) was created to combat the ruling of the monarchy and the 
aristocracy.
217
 Moreover, the focus on unity has assimilated with ideas of ‘homogeneity’ 
and ‘uniformity’. Thus, the view of the nation as a united and uniform collective came 
from this fundamentally important period in the construction of the French identity. In 
this light, indivisibility and unity is also at the core of the French idea of citizenship.  
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 The focus on uniformity in the French understanding of the nation and citizenship 
has led to problematic results for immigrants to France. According to this 
conceptualization, some historians argue that the role of immigration in the development 
of French society has largely been ignored by French history.
218
 Since the historiography 
of France has placed a prominence on the homogeneity of the nation rather than its 
differences, this has advised its ideas of assimilation, uniformity and universality.
219
 
Thus, creating an atmosphere where differences arising from region, ethnicity and other 
factors could be masked.
220
 Subsequently, discourse on immigration has been constructed 
as a phenomenon exterior to the history of the French, as opposed to, an internal problem 
which has been developing within French history.
221
 
 The conceptualization of laïcité is linked strongly to the ideas of citizenship. 
French secularism can be traced back to the 1801 Concordat, in which the church was 
placed in the hands of the state. Historically, the results of this could best be seen in the 
French education system. Out of all the other European countries, France remains the 
only country with no religious education in public schools (with the exception of the 
Alsace-Moselle region).
222
 This separation was further endorsed and defined in the 1905 
Law on séparation, which replaced the 1801 Concordat. This law made the relationship 
between the state and all religions crystal clear by declaring that the State would not 
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“recognize, finance or subsidize” any religion.223 It is important to note that the 1905 Law 
placed an emphasis on ‘religions’ instead of ‘the church’, which indicates the intent was 
to reinforce the French belief in secularism to the core.  
 Since its establishment, the 1905 Law has acquired a cultural significance in 
France; it is seen to embody the Republican and national principles in laïcité and unité. 
As it has lasted the constitutions of 1940, 1945 and 1946, in a sense, it is even stronger 
than the most current constitution.
224
 The 1958 Constitution, which is still in effect today, 
further defined the country with the terms ‘one’ and ‘indivisible’. Reinforcing the 
separation between the state and religion. Although, it should be noted that this law has 
not always been upheld strictly. It seems as if there has been some favouritism shown, 
majority of the time, to Catholics. This could be demonstrated in the Alsace-Moselle 
region retaining a religious education in their public schools on the grounds that the 
region was incorporated into France after the law was passed (it was part of Germany 
before).
225
 Moreover, the French government chooses to subsidize some private schools, 
with most of the chosen ones being Roman Catholic.
226
 Although, the state has also 
subsidized the building of a Grand Mosque in Paris, which should not to be 
overlooked.
227
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 The focus on French secularism and indivisibility has led to assimilationist 
tendencies towards immigrant groups. However, historical expectations of assimilation 
has been presented as a paradox. At the heart of assimilation is the idea that the national 
community, in this case France, must supersede all other identities.
228
 Thus, promoting 
the concept that every newcomer must be like the French, whilst also exclaiming that 
French identity has been culturally constructed through a shared history and unity, 
meaning no outsider could ever truly be French.
229
 This can further be seen in the official 
French category for the étranger (foreigner), which includes a vast number of non-
immigrants, such as the children born in France to immigrants parents who have not yet 
acquired full French nationality.
230
 Silverman further argues that, although this is the 
official terminology, within popular political discourse the term ‘foreigner’ is readily 
confused with the term ‘immigrant’. He goes on the claim that in contemporary French 
public discourse, the term ‘immigrant’ has been used to address visible minorities, most 
especially those of North African descent.
231
 Within the ideological underpinnings of 
French society (the reflections of which can be seen in the terminology on ‘foreigners’ 
and ‘immigrants’) there is an indication that assimilation has failed; both in terms of the 
acceptance of visible minorities such as the Muslims, and from the perspective of the 
minorities’ who feel rejected from French culture. This has become even more apparent 
with the French reactions to some pivotal events and the creation of certain laws which 
have directly targeting specific ethno-religious groups. 
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Although this paper will focus on immigration after World War II, a significant 
number of foreigners had been in France since before that period. This can be 
demonstrated with the 1851 census which provided statistics on the number of foreigners 
in France at the time,
232
 thus clearly, indicating that there was enough of a visible number 
of outsiders that a census was deemed necessary. Immigrants to France were generally 
seen as temporary contract workers, arriving just to fill a labour gap.
233
 Even though the 
naturalization law of 1889 projected to make ‘Frenchmen’ from foreigners, which comes 
in contrast to the economic view of immigrants.
234
 From this perspective France could be 
seen as showing more initial openness to immigrants, as they were readily accepted into 
the Republic as workers. Immigrants helped with the amount of labour that was required 
to allow France to sustain its economic growth during these years.
235
 Thus, these 
contradictions indicate a confusion over immigration issues since the beginning. 
The Headscarf Scandals 
 In the immediate postwar period France was open to immigration from various 
countries of origin, as previously stated, to fill labour shortages. However, the main 
recruits were arriving from other European countries. This can be seen in the 1945 
Ordinances, which outlined that immigrants would not be selected based on their 
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countries of origin.
236
 This section of the paper will firstly, lay an overview of how 
immigration issues evolved and created the background for the headscarf scandal of 
1989, followed by an analysis of the scandal with regards to the media’s role in 
intensifying it. Modern conceptions of problems arising from immigration in France 
started after the 1960s, precisely after the Algerian War. Therefore, controversies over 
immigration are a product of decolonization and the long lasting Algerian War, which 
created, “ethnic and racial fault lines in French society that persist today.”237 Since the 
postwar period, policies pursued by the French state have tried to dissuade immigration, 
in particular, they wanted the North Africans to return to their countries of origin.
238
 This 
could be seen in the ambiguous status of immigrants from North and West Africa. The 
Evian Agreements, which provided Algeria with independence in 1962, nevertheless, 
kept their colonial status as ‘citizens’ unchanged.239 This status allowed Algerians to 
move freely within France. Thus, leading to acceleration in the arrival of thousands of 
Algerians into France in the late 1960s, which encountered tighter French controls. Other 
former French colonies in Africa also provided a lot of immigrants in this time period.
240
   
 The 1970s was a time of economic downfall, and a period when the French 
government was trying to figure out how to better control the rising tide of immigration. 
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The open immigration regime held until the 1973-1974 OPEC oil crisis,
241
 which further 
led France towards an economic recession. After which the government tried to organize 
better control over worker and family immigration. This led to an immigration stop in 
1974, however, family reunification continued.
242
 Economic downfall and unemployment 
rates also contributed to a rise in xenophobia.
243
 During this period, the relations between 
the French state and the Muslim populations has been classified as toleration and minimal 
accommodation.
244
  
 Immigration became a large topic of concern in the 1980s, and started a dialogue 
on discussions of citizenship and nationality. The government finally recognized the vast 
amount of immigrants that had settled in France and acknowledged that policy and the 
state had to address them more directly. Muslims in particular, stood out, as there was 5 
million from North African origins.
245
 Moreover, Muslim populations were experiencing 
considerable disadvantages and were disproportionately affected by the economic strains. 
This can be seen in the children of North African migrants that lived in the suburbs 
suffering from high rates of unemployment, insufficient prayer spaces and no 
representation in the National Assembly.
246
 Furthermore, 1981 March for Equality and 
Against Racism was the first large-scale call for civil rights and was organized by the 
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second-generation youth.
247
 Thus, leading the government in constructing a “proactive 
state support for the emergence of an Islam de (of) France.”248  
 Although the recognition of Muslim communities and the need to address their 
needs was a positive move towards addressing the growing diversity in France, it came 
under heavy difficulties. This was due to a legal and social bind in the separation of the 
state and religion. Thus, trying to institutionalize and provide for the needs of the Muslim 
communities reignited the discussions around the place of religion in French society. 
Religion is especially significant in the French case because addressing diversity in 
French society from the point of view of citizenship or race and ethnicity was rejected.
249
 
Thus, with these discussions in mind, France moved towards policies of 
integration of immigrant populations. It is within this background that the ‘headscarf 
affair’ of 1989 erupted. In essence, this affair was the expulsion of three Muslim students 
from a public school in Creil, due to the fact that they refused to remove their 
headscarves. The head teacher at the school asserted that their refusal was a direct attack 
on the principles of laïcité, which were at the core of the Republic. As this was an issue 
with only 3 pupils at a small school in Creil it would not have been a huge national affair 
had it not been for the role of the media. In an atmosphere of immigration and integration 
issues and with right wing politics on the rise, this affair received wide attention.  
 Not only did this affair confirm a clash of cultures between the Muslims and the 
French, it also contributed to a view of Muslims as the alien ‘other’ which did not belong 
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in France. The culture of Muslims, especially with regards to the headscarf, was seen as 
sexist and archaic, thus, not fitting the French ideals of liberty and equality. Connolly 
argues that the state responds to alienated and fragmented identities within it by 
intensifying efforts to create unity.
250
 In this way, the state tries to establish a standard for 
normality. However, creating these pressures results in an expansion of abnormality and 
fragmentation.
251
 This was demonstrated in French politics and governance in the 
aftermath of the head scarf scandal. The slow contribution of this affair to the rise of 
Islamophobia could be seen in the rise of the right wing National Front party, which 
campaigned with the slogans claiming to end, “the colonization of France by Arab 
immigrants.”252 The government reacted to the rise of the National Front and the 
headscarf affair in 1989, by changing their soft assimilationist approach with a stronger 
assertion of integrationist plans. This could be demonstrated with the establishment of the 
High Council on Immigration, which would focus on developing integration goals and 
policies.
253
 
 Similar laws restricting and, most specifically, targeting Muslims have come into 
effect in later years, Such as the 2004 prohibition on religious symbols in public schools, 
also referred to as the Headscarf Ban, and the 2011 Burqa Ban, which are still in effect 
today. As well as the most recent 2016 Burkini Ban, which was later declared illegal by 
the court. These laws demonstrate  the ongoing and repetitive nature, in the struggle for 
French society and state, to accept the rights of the Muslim communities in expressing 
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and practicing their religion as they choose. To contrast, some scholars have argued that 
the discussion surrounding laws such as the 2004 prohibition on religious symbols are 
more often constructed on a binary framework which overlooks the institutional efforts to 
make more infrastructures available to Muslims. For instance, the opening of private 
Muslim schools.
254
 Although, the creation of more separate spaces for Muslims does not 
necessarily meet the requirements of a society, which needs to change its framework on 
where diversity can belong. Isolating certain groups from the mainstream only aids the 
further alienation of them from partaking in the collective identity. This arises from a 
paradox in France with regards to managing its Muslim population. Although, France 
officially institutionalized Islam in 2003; there is still a dynamic of trying to emancipate 
Muslims from their culture and religion.
255
 This is due to the fact that Islam is still feared 
and viewed as despotic and primitive within secular French ideology and culture. 
2005 Riots 
 The effects of 9/11 were experienced all over the world. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the atmosphere of Islamophobia it created was observed everywhere. 
For the French case, the Muslim populations which had been seen as hostile to 
assimilation became perceived as more and more hostile towards society. This prompted 
the state to create more avenues to recognize and include Muslims in the national 
community. This can be seen in the establishment of the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman (CFCM) in 2003, which marked the official institutionalization of Islam in 
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France. Moreover, it was also made to combat rising levels of religious extremism.
256
 
Thus, displaying the rising level of fear directed at Islam within France. This section of 
the paper will outline the issues between the Muslim and Jewish communities that have 
been affected by the conflict in the Middle East. Subsequently, there will be a focus on 
the impact of the 2005 Riots, with the results of it seen in the new conceptualization of 
‘diversity’ within France. 
 Concurrent to the struggle of Muslim populations to integrate into French society, 
there has been an ongoing internal friction between the Muslim and Jewish populations. 
Not only are the Muslim and Jewish communities the largest two ethno-religious groups 
within France, France also holds the largest amount of Muslim and Jewish populations 
living together (outside of Israel).
257
 Although the Muslim population is proportionally 
larger.
258
 Prominent scholars, such as Mandel, have argued that the polarization between 
these groups have a complex history, however, one of the greatest contributing factors is 
the Arab-Israeli conflict happening in the Middle East.
259
 This has resulted in continuous 
distaste between the communities, especially increasing after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. 
Minor strife could be seen in the student protests following the war, and again in the 
tensions following the Gulf War in the 1980s,
260
 and since then, in other instances such as 
the violence against Jews perpetrated by Arab youth in the autumn of 2000. The tensions 
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between these groups have predominantly been caused by conflict in the Middle East and 
have enforced a negative perception of Muslims and their lack of ability to let go of 
fraternities outside of France, thus, demonstrating a lack of assimilability. 
However, the threat of Muslims to the people of France became even more 
profound and gripped the attention of the public after the riots in 2005. These riots started 
just a few months after, and within the same year, of the London bombings. Thus, 
drawing the potential of violence closer to home until it finally erupted in the French 
banlieues (suburbs). The riots were perpetrated by the second-generation youth of 
immigrant backgrounds. It involved arson on cars and public buildings. These riots 
resulted in many changes, both on the discourse surrounding ethnicity and the perception 
of Muslims in France. They demonstrated an accumulation of discrimination and 
marginalization felt by the Muslim youth for years. 
 The political response to these riots was that there was a “deep malaise”, within 
French society.
261
 Second and even third generation immigrants still did not feel as if 
they belonged. Assimilation and integration strategies had clearly failed to some extent. It 
has been argued by many scholars that France is ‘colour-blind’, that is to say, public 
discourse was not as open to discussions around ethnicity and race. There has been many 
restrictions on measuring diversity in French legislation.
262
 Moreover, throughout the 
1980s and 1990s racial problems were obscured by social euphemisms.
263
 Ignoring the 
racial problem has created paradoxes with the French attitude on diversity issues. It has 
                                                          
261
 Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism,” 119. 
262
 Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism,” 120. 
263
 Kiwan, Identities, Discourses and Experiences, 62. 
 65 
 
also not helped with research and policy development. This ambivalence has been 
prominent in French politics for decades. As it has been demonstrated throughout this 
chapter, France has had a growing diversity for a long period of time, regardless of this 
fact there is no direct recognition and framework for addressing ‘race’ the way there was 
in Britain. The word ‘diversity’ itself, only enters the lexicon after the 2005 riots.264 Thus, 
it is the impact of these riots which helps both the state and the society realize more 
strongly that there is inequality and dissatisfaction within minority ethnic groups in 
France. More specifically, it brings ‘ethnicity’ to the foreground of discussions. As 
Nicholas Sarkozy remarks, “[the rioters] are legally fully French. But let’s say things as 
they are: polygamy and acculturation of a certain number of families means that is more 
difficult to integrate a young person originating from Sub-Saharan Africa than it is a 
young French person from another origin.”265 
 The acceptance that there was diversity within French culture widened the 
discussion about how to manage it. This brought forth new conceptualizations of laïcité. 
It was argued that a new perspective on laïcité could help France cope with its 
multicultural nature. This was explained by some scholars as laïcité plurielle, which 
acknowledged the plural nature of French society while trying to unify it. The Stasi 
Report of 2003 declared the presence of a new laïcité in France, which Sarkozy claimed 
would defend state support for building religious infrastructure.
266
 Although, after the 
2005 riots the intellectual and public debate in France surrounding laïcité plurielle turned 
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sour. This can be seen in the arguments of the philosopher and historian, Pierre-André 
Taguieff. As Kiwan argues, Taguieff’s earlier work focused on anti-racism and the cult of 
cultural difference, whereas in the post-riot era he declared a more hardened stance on the 
issues of diversity.
267
 He said that new plural visions of laïcité were ‘hyperpluralism’ and 
‘hypertolerance’, which impeded on true liberalism in Western societies.268 Taguieff 
further argued that only the true laïcité could bridge the differences in society and 
cultures, and in this way, he was espousing the continuation of the assimilationist 
perspective.
269
 Moreover, Kiwan argues that Taguieff’s views reflected his fears of Islam 
and Islamism within Europe.
270
 
Conclusion 
 From the perspective of identity politics, it can be argued that the French reaction 
and delays in addressing the concerns of Muslim population by relying on a notion of 
their culture as secular and thus inherently opposed to religiosity, demonstrates the 
fundamental flaw that exists in all cultures. As Connolly says, “Every culture seems to 
contain some themes that are both indispensable to it and inherently problematic within 
it.”271 Moreover, the indispensability of these characteristics lead to their concealment.272 
Thus, making it harder to realize and change their problematic nature. Within France, this 
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notion has manifested itself in the strict conceptualization of laïcité and its protection in 
society which is caused by its deeper connection to nationality and the identity of the 
French. As the prominent philosopher, Charles Taylor, has argued there needs to be 
redefinition of laïcité and secularism, because the current construction of it has been 
contradictory and restrictive. Taylor argues that secularism endorses state neutrality and a 
neutral state should avoid favouring at all costs.
273
 This means one religion cannot be 
favoured over another; moreover non-religion cannot be favoured over religion. Proper 
secularism should be the maintenance of absolute state neutrality.  
In the French case, this would translate to not placing a tradition of Christianity 
over the Muslim religion of the immigrant groups, as well as not championing nonbelief 
over belief. All of which is to say there are clear imbalances and contradictions still very 
much present in French society. As can be seen in the most recent events, such as Charlie 
Hebdo of 2015 and the Burkini Ban of 2016. The Charlie Hebdo incident, similar to the 
Rushdie affair of the UK, more profoundly demonstrated the continuing clash of cultures 
that has, not only, remained unresolved but has worsened over time because of a 
contribution of factors such as; increasing conflicts in the Middle East, rise in extreme 
Islamic terrorism in the West, and the emphasis placed on these issues in the media. 
Thus, upon deeper analysis, it begs to question whether complete state neutrality could 
solve the problem of negligence and hostility felt by the Muslim communities that have 
been directly disrupted by certain laws. Is it realistic to espouse an agenda that aims to 
ignore differences in order to accept differences? 
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 In conclusion, this chapter has argued that France’s reliance on secularism has 
delayed the discussion on pluralism and has been partly responsible for the lack of 
acceptance of diversity that is still present within the French state. This has been done 
through a discussion of the place of nationalism and laïcité within French identity and its 
contribution to the understanding of citizenship and immigrants. Moreover, the headscarf 
scandal of 1989 was discussed in length and how it portrayed a divided society was 
shown. Finally, the 2005 riots were explained and their impact on the discourse and 
lexicon surrounding diversity was demonstrated. Overall, the French case illustrates an 
ongoing battle with competing identities and limiting frameworks that make the 
acceptance of diversity even harder in the backdrop of an ever more challenging global 
environment and hostility towards Islam and Muslims. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This paper has illustrated a rise in identity politics over the years with the 
concurrent rise of Islamophobia, which has led to a lack of acceptance towards diversity 
within Europe, especially towards Europe’s Muslims. This was demonstrated with an 
analysis of the case studies, UK and France. The UK has used a multicultural framework 
to address its diversity which has been progressive, yet insufficient. This was contrasted 
with the case of France. France has rejected the multicultural framework and instead 
depended on their already rooted framework of secularism to deal with diversity, which 
has shown to have clear limitations in accepting diverse groups.  
For the case of the UK, it was demonstrated that a construction of British identity 
and nationalism arose through an imperial mindset of conquest and superiority. As seen 
in the original expansion of England towards Ireland and Scotland, and the resilient 
exceptionality in the English identity, which has survived onto today, making it harder 
for migrant groups to feel an acceptance within an English identity as opposed to a 
Scottish identity. This identity framework has been applied to the immigrant groups 
which came in the post-colonial, postwar period, and led to the construction of 
multiculturalism. On the other hand, French nationality has been shown to be rooted in 
the ideals obtained in the French Revolution. One of the strongest of which has been the 
concept of unité, which contributed to the development of laïcité through later laws and 
constitutions. Laïcité has grown to be a national ideal and a distinct part of French 
identity. Thus, although diversity had been growing in France for some time, especially 
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in the postcolonial period, France has asserted the framework of laïcité to assimilate its 
diverse immigrant populations. 
 In the early immigration period there does not appear to be a specifically hostile 
environment towards Muslims in Britain, they are alienated just like the other migrant 
groups. However history in the rise of Islamophobia shows how the perception of 
Muslims in particular has changed dramatically. One of the significant events which have 
been a catalyst in this change has been the OPEC Oil Embargo, along with the general 
distaste which came with the economic disparities of the time. After this incident, the 
Muslims in the UK really stood out and became disliked members of society. This 
perception later experienced a complete change after the Rushdie affair of 1989, which 
demonstrated the length of difference between Muslim and British cultures. Moreover it 
added to the growing landscape of Islamophobia with the use of the role of the media in 
hyping this event. Rising levels of Islamophobia due to the media was also seen in France 
with the headscarf scandal of 1989. The headscarf issue illustrated several faults within 
French society, firstly, a lack of tolerance in the different practices of Muslims and 
secondly, alienation and ostracizing of Muslims from mainstream French culture.  
 The perception of Muslims and their country of citizenship has also been affected 
by conflict and wars happening in the Middle East, primarily through aiding a rise in 
Islamophobia and creating fault lines between the host country and their countries of 
origin (or affiliation through race or religion). This was demonstrated in the UK with the 
Gulf War of 1991 and in France with the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Israelis. In 
the case of the UK the Gulf War led to the alienation of Muslim groups and asked for 
them to prove their alliance to Britishness as opposed to another identity; whereas, in 
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France, the Arab-Israeli conflict was reflected in their Arab and Jewish populations, 
which further portrayed Muslims as a violent group.  
The peak in Islamophobia was observed after the events of 9/11, but more 
profoundly after homegrown violence was perpetrated by the Muslims within the UK and 
France. This was seen in the UK after the 7/7 attacks, which led to a questioning of the 
multicultural framework that had been developing since the 1980s and its effectiveness. 
On the other hand, in France violence was seen in 2005 as a reaction of Muslim youth to 
being disadvantaged by the state. Moreover, it was only after these riots that a lexicon on 
‘diversity’ really entered France. Until then there was minimal acceptance of the actual 
amount of immigrant groups present in France. Although the acceptance of the vast 
amount of diversity only aided the creation of further assimilationist and integrationist 
frameworks. Thus, in comparison to the UK, France has shown a lag in accepting its 
diversity; which demonstrates a denial within the French state and society towards both 
the presence of a large number of Muslims and a need to create a competing mechanism 
for including them within the French identity.  
This is especially significant for the case of France, as it holds the highest number 
of Muslims, and according to PEW Research Center, is projected to have the largest 
growth in Muslim populations in the coming years, with the UK coming in second. To 
have a better understanding for the reluctance to accept the Muslim populations in 
Europe, a further analysis of how religion has been affected by secular and multicultural 
frameworks is necessary. For the UK, there has been a tradition of internal religious 
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plurality which has affected the relations between the state and the church.
274
 This has 
contributed to the creation of multicultural, multi-religious, framework of tolerance. Even 
if Islam has experienced an exclusion from this acceptance with the rise of Islamophobia, 
the UK has benefitted from a history of trying to balance between the distinctiveness of 
multiple cultures and subsections of Christianity. On the other hand, France has built its 
identity over a culture of secularism and uniformity, which has resulted in little public 
space for difference. This has created a public sphere which has disregarded the 
differences of plural cultures and religions. Further explaining why it has taken France a 
longer time than the UK to more actively accept and address its diversity. 
The study of diversity and Islamophobia in Europe has opened up the valve to 
identity politics and how best to address plurality. According to Connolly’s theory the 
best way to combat difference in a society is to create an engagement between collective 
and personal identities.
275
 As everyone has both a personal identity and a desire as 
humans to belong to a collective identity.
276
 Thus, Connolly argues that the public sphere 
should be where an open and free dialogue between the differences in collective and 
personal identities can take place.
277
 Moreover, a harmonious identity cannot be created 
by shunning difference in the place of neutrality. Therefore, neutrality in essence, is the 
ignorance of the differences in identity and society. Thus, creating a paradoxical 
relationship between identity and difference could be a way to solve diversity problems, 
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in order for people, who do not belong in the hegemonized version of identity within a 
culture, to feel a sense of acceptance with regards to their differences.  
 Overall, although the UK has shown a better mechanism to deal with difference, 
latest trends in security and global affairs demonstrate that diversity is not as accepted as 
it might have otherwise seemed. Moreover, the growth of nativist nationalism and right-
wing politics indicates a move away from multicultural solidarity. It should be 
emphasized that the rise of Islamophobia and the backlash towards diversity is a 
multilayered and complex issue, which this paper has attempted to unwrap by examining 
a combination of factors, some of which are: immigration, policy, economy, conflicts in 
the Middle East and other major events. There is much more work that could be done in 
this area. Later research in this field could focus on providing a more comprehensive 
study of the perceptions of the actual public with regards to the Muslim populations, as 
well as the perceptions of the Muslims with regards to feeling accepted. Further gaps 
could be present between the opinion of the general population and the creation of public 
policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akan, Murat. “Diversité: Challenging or Constituting Laicité?” French Cultural Studies 
28, no. 1 (2017): 123-137. 
Alam, Yunis and Charles Husband, “Islamophobia, Community Cohesion and Counter-
Terrorism Policies in Britain.” Patterns of Prejudice 47, no. 3 (2013): 235-252. 
Alcoff, Linda. Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
Allen, Chris. “‘Down with Multiculturalism, Book-burning and Fatwas’: The Discourse 
of the Death of Multiculturalism.” Culture and Religion 8, no. 2 (2007): 125-138. 
“Attentat à Paris: Cazeneuve accuse Le Pen et Fillon d'avoir fait ‘le choix de l'outrance et 
de la division’” 20 Minutes, April 21 2017. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of 
Nationalism. London; Verson, 1983.  
Bettie, Julie. Women Without Class: Girls, Race and Identity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003. 
Blumer, Herbert. “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.” The Pacific 
Sociological Review 1, no. 1 (1958): 3-7. 
Bonino, Stefano. “Policing Strategies against Islamic Terrorism the UK after 9/11: The 
Socio-Political Realities for British Muslims.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 
32, no. 1 (2012): 5-31. 
 75 
 
Cameron, David.  “PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference.” UK Government, 
published February 5, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-
speech-at-munich-security-conference. 
Carrell, Severin. “Sturgeon Urged to Delay Scottish Independence Vote Until 2020.” The 
Guardian, October 7, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/07/sturgeon-urged-to-delay-
scottish-independence-vote-until-2020s. 
Casanova, Jose. “The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe Catholicism in the United 
States.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 34, no. 4-5 (2012): 485-495. 
Castles, Stephen. Ethnicity and Globalization; From Migrant Worker to Transnational 
Citizen. London; Sage, 2000. 
Chaplin, Jonathan. “Liberté, Laicité, Pluralité: Towards a Theology of Principled 
Pluralism.” International Journal of Public Theology 10 (2016): 354-380. 
Cervulle, Maxim. “The Use of Universalism. ‘Diversity Statistics and the Race Issue in 
Contemporary France.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 17, no. 2 (2014): 
118-133. 
Cesari, Jocelyne. “Securitization of Islam in Europe,” Die Weltz Islams 52 (2012): 430-
449. 
Cohen, Robin. “Fuzzy Frontiers of Identity: The British Case.” Social Identities 1 
(November 1995): 35-62. 
 76 
 
Connolly, William E. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 
London: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Connor, Phillip. “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity in Europe.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
37, no. 11 (2014): 2055-2070. 
Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: a Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-
Racist Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139-167. 
Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Colour.” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 
1241-1299. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 1967. 
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963.  
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality; Volume I: An Introduction. Translated by 
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. 
Geisser, Vincent. “Islamophobia: French Specificity in Europe?” Human Architecture: 
Journal of Sociology of Self-Knowledge 8, no. 2 (2010): 39-46. 
Gietel-Basten, Stuart. “Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity.” 
Population and Development Review 42, no. 4 (Spring 2016): 673-680. 
Graf, Rudiger. “Making use of the ‘Oil Weapon’: Western Industrialized Countries and 
Arab Petropolitics in 1973-1974.” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (2012): 185-208. 
 77 
 
Gunn, Jeremy. “Religion and Law in France: Secularism, Separation and State 
Intervention.” Drake Law Review 57 (2009): 949-984. 
Hollifield, James. “France: Immigration and the Republican Tradition in France.” In 
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Edited by James Hollifield, 
Phillip L. Martin and Pia Orrenius, 157-187. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2014. 
Ignatiev, Noel. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
Israel, Mark. South African Political Exile in the United Kingdom. Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1999. 
Alexander C. Jeffrey, “Struggling Over the Mode of Incorporation: Backlash Against 
Multiculturalism in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 4 (2013): 531-556. 
Jones, Erik. “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe.” The International Spectator 48, 
no. 1 (2013): 102-116. 
Joppke, Christian. “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in  the Liberal State: Theory and 
Policy.” The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 237-257. 
Kauffmann, Eric. “It’s not the Economy Stupid: Brexit as a Story of Personal Values.” 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, July, 7, 2016. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/personal-values-brexit-vote/ 
Kepel, Gilles. Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997. 
 78 
 
Khan, Zafar. “Muslim Presence in Europe: The British Dimension— Identity, Integration 
and Community Activism.” Current Sociology 48, no. 4 (2000): 29-43. 
Kiwan, Nadia.  Identities, Discourses and experiences: Young People of North African 
Origin in France. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009. 
Koenig, Matthias. “Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation-States- A 
Comparison of the United Kingdom, France and Germany.” Journal of 
International Migration and Integration 6, no. 2 (2005): 219-234. 
Kuru, Ahmet. “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe: Analyzing French 
Exceptionalism.” Comparative Politics (2008): 1-19. 
Laurence, Jonathan. “From the Elysee Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam 
Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France.” French Politics, Culture & 
Society 23, no. 1 (2005): 37-64. 
Lassalle, Didier. “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism: A convergence in 
Progress?” Journal of Intercultural Studies 32, no. 3 (2011): 229-243. 
Lebl, Leslie S. “Radical Islam in Europe.” Foreign Policy Research Institute (2010): 46-
60. 
 
Lewis, Philip. Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 1994. 
Lipsitz, George. The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Benefit from 
Identity Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006. 
 79 
 
Mandel, Maud S. Muslims and Jews in France: History of Conflict. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014. 
Mazari, Shireen. “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe.” Policy Perspectives 7, no. 1 
(2010): 91-101. 
Mead, Matthew. “Empire Windrush: The Cultural Memory of an Imaginary Arrival.” 
Journal of Post-Colonial Writing 45, no. 2 (2009): 137-149. 
McLaren, Lauren. “Immigration and Political Trust in the UK.” Political Insight 4, no 3 
(2013): 14-17. 
Meer, Nasar. Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism; the Rise of 
Muslim Consciousness. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Miller, David. “Promotion and Power.” In Introduction to Media, edited by Adam Briggs 
and Paul Cobley, 41-52. London: Longman, 2002. 
Modood, Tariq. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
Modood, Tariq. Not Easy Being British: Colour, Culture and Citizenship. London: 
Trentham Books Limited, 1992. 
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. Racial Formations in the United States: From 1960s 
to 1990s. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Paul, Kathleen. Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997. 
 80 
 
Piper, Adrian. “Passing for White, Passing for Black (1991)” In Out of Order, Out of 
Sight, Volume I: Selected Essays in Meta-Art 1968-1992. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996. 
Poole, Elizabeth. “The Case of Geert Wilders: Multiculturalism, Islam and Identity in the 
UK.” Journal of Religion in Europe 5 (2012):162-191. 
Portes, Jonathan. “Immigration after Brexit.” National Institute Economic Review 238, 
no. 1 (2016): 13-21. 
Poynting, Scott and Victoria Mason, “The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia; Anti-Muslim 
Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2011.” Journal of Sociology 
43, no 1 (2007): 61-86. 
Romeyn, Esther. “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Spectropolitics and Immigration.” 
Theory, Culture and Society 31, no. 6 (2014): 77-101. 
Runnymead Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. London: Runnymead Trust, 
1997. 
Saeed, Amir. “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: Representation of Islam and Muslims in 
the Media.” Sociology Compass 1, no. 2 (2007): 443- 462. 
Sales, Rosemary. “Britain and Britishness; Place, Belonging and Exclusion.” In Muslims 
in Britain; Making Social and Political Space, edited by Waqar I. U. Ahmad and 
Ziauddin Sardar, 33-52. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Sardar, Ziauddin and Waqar I. U. Ahmad. “Introduction.” In Muslims in Britain, edited 
by Waqar I. U. Ahmad and Ziauddin Sardar, 1-16. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
 81 
 
Schiffer, Sabine and Constantin Wagner. “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia- New 
Enemies, Old Patterns.” Race and Class 52, no. 3 (2011): 77-84. 
Silverman, Maxim. “Citizenship and the Nation-State in France.” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 14, no. 3 (1991): 333-349. 
Silverman, Maxim. Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in 
Modern France. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Taylor, Charles. “Why We Need Radical Redefinition of Secularism.” In The Power of 
Religion in the Public Sphere. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan 
Vanantwerpen, 34-59. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
Thorpe, Kier. “The Forgotten Shortage: Britain’s handling of the 1967 Oil Embargo.” 
Contemporary British History 21, no 2 (2007): 201-222. 
Tomlinson, Sally. “Immigration, Immigration, Immigration.” Renewal: a Journal of 
London Labour Politics 21, no. 4 (2013): 66-73. 
Tyrer, David and Salman Sayyid. “Governing Ghosts: Race, Incorporeality and 
Difference in Post-Political Times.” Current Sociology 60, no. 3 (2012): 353-367. 
Vertovec, Steven. “Super-diversity and its Implications.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, 
no. 6 (2007): 1024-1054. 
Vidino, Lorenzo and James Brandon. “Europe’s Experience in Countering 
Radicalization: Approaches and Challenges.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence 
and Counter Terrorism 7 no. 2 (2012): 163-179. 
 82 
 
VITA AUCTORIS  
 
Tugce Arslan was born in 1993 in Ankara, Turkey. She graduated from Albert 
Campbell Collegiate Institute in 2011. From there she went to the University of Toronto 
where she obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History. She is 
currently a candidate for the Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of 
Windsor and hopes to graduate in Spring 2018. 
 
